Introduction
Economic recession in the U.S. and continuing job losses prompted the new president to suggest policies that would make outsourcing a relatively expensive activity.
Firms, which will rely on outsourced activities, will find it harder to get "tax-breaks".
Similarly, procedure or formalities for H-1B visa (a type of visa required by foreign nationals to work temporarily in USA) are also being made stringent. The tax on outsourcing activities is expected to reverse the trend in fragmentation of production and to provide a boost to the demand for local labor.
Some papers have attempted to analyze the general equilibrium incidence of an outsourcing tax 1 in a relatively capital abundant country like the U.S., where firms outsource their relatively labor intensive production fragments. Arndt (1997) , Markusen and Venables (2005) , among others, assume full employment of factors and a small open economy, to show that if the outsourcing sector is labor (capital) intensive, the tax hurts (benefits) labor. A limitation of most of these papers is that they consider only the final good sectors. Outsourcing, however, is a reality even in sectors, which produce intermediate inputs 2 . For example, if airline services are conceived as inputs to business activities; then call centers outside the U.S. serving the airlines are contributing towards the provision of an intermediate input. Although in the example above the input is nontraded, outsourcing can also take place in a traded input (as it lowers the cost of production in the outsourced fragment). This paper stands out from its predecessors on 1 The tax is generally interpreted as escalation of cost on offshore outsourcing. Other than the policy hurdles and transport cost it may also include the monitoring and coordinating cost of offshore workers as considered in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008 Leamer's (1996) result that it is the sector bias rather than the factor bias that determines how a factor's reward may change due to globalization (or technological change). In our paper, the relative factor intensity of the relevant sector is most critical in determining the direction of change of the wage rate. 5 In addition, we find that when the intermediate input is traded, the outsourcing tax closes down either the intermediate input sector or the final good sector, which uses it specifically in its production.
The next section presents the model. In the subsections we discuss the results for the cases where the intermediate input is non-traded and traded, respectively. The last section concludes.
3 Markusen and Venables (2005) also considers an intermediate input producing sector but does not discuss a tax which is exclusive on input side of the intermediate good producing sector, as we do in this paper. 4 The result assumes no reversal of factor intensity rankings of the commodities consequent on outsourcing of the labor intensive fragmented part of the production. 5 We thank the editor Eric Bond for drawing this similarity to our attention.
The Model and Results
The economy 
M is non-traded
Following equations provide a formal description of the model. Symbols have usual natural interpretations. Competitive price conditions imply:
(1)
where t is the tax on outsourced input. Full employment conditions give us:
For market clearance the demand for M must match its supply:
Also note that by CRS when factor prices are determined the factor intensities are also determined. Simple manipulation of the equations (2) and (3) yield:
Consider equations (1) and (7) and work out the effect of change in t on w. Using '' over a variable to denote proportional change one can get:
where T = 1 + t.
Note ij
 s are factor income shares in unit cost. From equation (8) and (9):
Equation (10) 
Proof: As t > 0 equation (10) implies
Suppose we violate the necessary condition such that
from inequality (11) we obtain:
So, w cannot fall following a rise in t. On the other hand, suppose we satisfy the sufficient condition
If the sufficient condition holds it must be true that:
Using the definitions of KY  and LY  we obtain:
Hence from equation (10) Finally, note that in our model if the outsourcing tax increases the wage rate, it must reduce p M . This is a peculiar but very interesting outcome. In this case, as Y decreases, demand for M drops considerably leading to a decline in p M . This is apparently paradoxical, because the tax makes foreign labor more costly for M, but that cannot (in equilibrium) translate to a rise in its price.
M is traded
When M is traded, its price is frozen by the "small" economy assumption.
Therefore, the market clearing equation for M (equation-6) no longer applies here. X, Y and M are produced using the same technology as above. The full employment conditions of the primary factors of production also remain unchanged. We are left with equations (1) through (5) to determine the equilibrium of this economy.
There are two possible equilibria and patterns of trade that can arise after the imposition of the outsourcing tax. To understand this first consider the case where there is no outsourcing tax (i.e., t = 0). Assume that the economy produces all three goods X, Y and M, with labor and capital as primary inputs. Initial w and r must be such that equations (1) through (3) must hold as equalities. Now consider the imposition of a small outsourcing tax (i.e., t > 0). At the initial (w, r) equations (1) and (3) are satisfied, but the left hand side of (2) must exceed the right hand side. This means that the cost of domestic production of M must exceed the given international price p M at the initial factor price combination. One possibility is that this leads to a closure of domestic production of M , with all the M being imported for use in Y at the given international price p M .
Notice that full employment of factors will require that all the labor and capital that was previously employed by M is fully absorbed by X or Y. Given that Y does not use capital, all of it needs to be absorbed by X. At initial (w, r), X's factor intensity is given, thus X must expand to absorb the extra capital. If X is more capital intensive than M, it can absorb all the capital and part of the labor that M releases. The labor that is left over after absorption in X, can be used up through an expansion of Y, which can import a corresponding amount of M to keep its factor intensity constant. Thus the pattern of trade must involve greater imports of M and countervailing adjustments in X and Y to keep trade balanced. Note, however, that there is another type of equilibrium that is possible when X is relatively labor intensive compared to M. Consider the case that we discuss above where M shuts down. To absorb all the capital that is released at unchanged factor prices, X will need more labor than what M can provide. This labor has to come from Y.
Thus Y must shrink. If it releases enough labor to fully employ the capital in sector X, full employment is achieved at the original factor prices. However, if the amount of labor used by Y at the initial equilibrium is sufficiently small, it will not be able to release enough labor to employ all the additional capital in X at unchanged factor prices, even if Y shuts down. The resulting excess demand for labor can be resolved if w rises. If w rises then from equation (1) we know that r falls. This fall in r can allow equation (2) to be satisfied and thus allow M to stay in business. However, since Y does not use capital, its unit cost has to rise faced with a constant p M and a higher w. In this case, Y shuts down and consequently all the M that is domestically produced must be exported. In this second case, the effect of a change in t on w is obtained from equations (1) and (2):
where ij  s are factor income share in unit cost. From equation (12) and (13):
Proposition 2: 
Proof:
The first part of the proposition follows from the discussion above and an inspection of equations (1) Proposition 2 has interesting policy implications. A government that is committed to keeping the M or the Y sector in operation while it imposes an outsourcing tax may have to support it through additional policy instruments like an import tariff. Effectively, to balance conflicting policy objectives, more distortions may need to be introduced.
While we do not model this issue here, in reality the government's preference for survival of M or Y may stem from lobbying done by factors specific to these sectors, whose welfare is inextricably linked with production in that sector.
Conclusions
The paper shows that there are critically important differences between the effects of outsourcing that is related to the intermediate input sector, compared to outsourcing that caters to final good production. Also, it is important to identity whether the intermediate input is traded or non-traded. If it is non-traded, labor is hurt even if the intermediate input producing sector (suffering from the outsourcing tax) is the most capital-intensive in the economy. This finding is apparently paradoxical. On the other hand, if the input is traded, the domestic production of either the intermediate good or the final good using the input becomes non-viable. Therefore, if the government wants to sustain either of these sectors when it imposes an outsourcing tax, it has to consider further policy intervention (for example, a protective tariff), which may further distort the economy.
